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This paper examines the influence of the 2007-08 financial crisis on value creation for 
acquirer’s shareholders in the banking industry using a sample of 883 deals over 2004-12. 
Applying an exploratory and top-down approach, we look at banking acquisitions at the 
global level, narrowing our analysis step-by-step to consider domestic versus cross-border 
acquisitions, and then split cross-border deals based on the economic development of the 
acquirer and target countries. We observe that only acquisitions involving emerging-economy 
acquirers and developed-economy targets generate positive and significant returns to 
shareholders after the crisis. We also observe major changes in the global acquisition 
landscape since 2007 with emerging-economy banks increasing their acquisition activity, both 
nationally and internationally.  
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1. Introduction  
The main purpose of this paper is to identify the influence of the 2007-08 financial crisis 
on acquisitions in the global banking industry and examine whether such acquisitions created 
value for acquirer’s shareholders after the crisis. The recent financial crisis started as a 
banking systemic crisis in the United States and had a profound impact on the banking system 
around the world. According to Billings and Capie (2011), the USA entered in financial crisis 
in 2007 followed by the UK. Similarly, Estonia, Ireland, and Latvia began experiencing 
economic recession in the first quarter of 2008, and by the first quarter of 2009, all European 
countries entered into economic recession (Claessens et al. 2010). In the banking sector, the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 led to a credit crunch and a global banking crisis (Bao, 
Olson, and Yuan 2011; Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2010; Arezki, Candelon, and Sy 2011). The 
years 2007 and 2008 have been defined as the crisis period in several studies (Beltratti and 
Paladino 2013; Beltratti and Stulz 2012; Rao-Nicholson and Salaber 2014b). Authors have 
discussed the reckless risks undertaken by managers in the financial sector and the unintended 
outcomes of these risks leading to untenable losses and eventual bankruptcy of several 
financial institutions. Stock market indices dropped by 50-75% from the highest due to the 
crisis (Te Velde et al. 2009) and such stock market devaluation has restrained the value of 
transactions worldwide. Also, equity and debt financing for mergers and acquisitions became 
more difficult and expensive after the financial crisis (UNCTAD 2009). Yet, as stock markets 
worldwide experienced sharp price decreases, especially in the banking industry, this 
economic distress provided the opportunity for investors to make good deals as some banks 
were undervalued by the market due to contagion phenomena experienced by this industry.  
Two phenomena emerged in this industry, one, domestically, banks consolidated their 
position through acquisitions, and two, in terms of cross-border acquisitions, banks from 
emerging economies acquired larger banks in developed markets. Domestic acquisitions and 
restructuring was mediated and encouraged in several developed economies. In their study, 
Molyneux et al. (2014) identify this as ‘too-big-to-fail’ and ‘too-systemically-important-to-
fail’ issues which drive governments to provide safety nets to these large banking institutions. 
The authors find that safety net benefits resulting from mergers and acquisitions are positively 
related to rescue probability, implying moral hazard in banking systems. Also, unlike other 
financial crises which typically emerged from a structural weakness in emerging economies, 
the recent financial crisis originated in developed countries. This meant that while in previous 
crises, banks from developed economies acquired banks and other financial institutions from 
emerging economies, in the fallout of the recent financial crisis, the impetus to global 
acquisitions was provided by emerging-economy banks like those from China, Russia, Brazil, 
Malaysia and Qatar. 
Nevertheless, acquisitions, especially in the banking industry, have continued throughout 
these crisis years. Some of these banking acquisitions were driven by the financial distress of 
the target, such as the fire sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan Chase in March 2008. Other 
bank acquisitions announced after the crisis were motivated by traditional expansion 
strategies, like the acquisition of Austrian Volksbank International by Russian Sberbank in 
2011. Though extant literature has acknowledged the significant impact of systemic 
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turbulence on acquisition activities (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; Harford 2005; Mody and 
Negishi 2000), there has been limited research into the impact of the recent financial 
turbulence on the performance of acquiring firms. Extant research about the performance of 
acquisitions during a crisis, including in the banking sector, focuses on a single country or a 
single region (Tse and Soufani 2001; Beltratti and Paladino 2013; Rao-Nicholson and Salaber 
2014b, 2014a). Thus, it is imperative to understand the impact of the financial crisis on the 
performance of acquisitions in the banking industry at the global level.  
Since most studies, even during non-crisis period, are mostly inconclusive for acquirers’ 
short term gains, in this paper we take an exploratory approach towards our research. We use 
a large sample of 883 bank acquisitions conducted between 2004-12 around the world to 
investigate the performance of acquirers before and after the financial crisis. To do so, we 
adopt a top-down approach, looking first at bank acquisitions at a global level, and narrowing 
our analysis step-by-step to consider domestic versus cross-border acquisitions, and then split 
cross-border deals based on the economic development of the acquirer and target countries 
(emerging-economy to emerging-economy (EE-EE), emerging-economy to developed-
economy (EE-DE), developed-economy to emerging-economy (DE-EE), and developed-
economy to developed-economy (DE-DE)). Such step-by-step analysis allows us to answer 
very interesting questions and present original evidence about the impact of the financial 
crisis on the performance of bank acquisitions around the world. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
motivates a series of empirical questions. Section 3 discusses the methodology used in our 
research and presents our empirical model. Section 4 elaborates on the data selection process 
and describes it in detail. Section 5 presents our empirical results and discusses robustness 
checks. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature Review and Empirical Questions  
Several authors have postulated on the effect of crises on acquisition activity and 
performance to acquirer’s shareholders. Nelson (1959) and other economists have argued that 
the variation in acquisition activity is narrowly linked to different stages of the business cycle 
and authors have found that, typically, stock market boom has been connected with a frenzy 
merger and acquisition activity. The underlying reason for this observation is that during 
economic boom, there is a willingness of stock markets to allow firms to issue new shares to 
raise capital and also, average companies experience higher corporate profitability. 
Conversely, companies and stock markets might adopt a conservative approach during an 
economic downturn. Thus, authors have suggested a close relationship between general 
economic performance and takeover activity. In terms of international deals, firms from non-
crisis regions will target companies in crisis-affected regions (Mody and Negishi 2000; 
Aguiar and Gopinath 2005). The increase in the number of crisis-afflicted targets allows stock 
prices to more clearly reflect advantages for foreign acquirers. During the two 1990s merger 
waves in the UK, the wealth effect to the bidders’ shareholders was found to be sensitive to 
the economic cycle only for friendly acquisitions (Tse and Soufani 2001). Regarding the 
Asian crisis, no excess returns were observed during the crisis period for cross-border deals 
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(Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 2004). During the same crisis, most bank acquisitions within the 
region were actually consolidations advanced by local governments to protect their domestic 
banks (Crouzille, Lepetit, and Bautista 2008). For example, in Malaysia, 54 small banks and 
financial institutions were merged into six large groups. Banks in countries like Indonesia and 
Korea experienced similar government-mediated mergers and acquisitions. In the above 
study, authors find that the market reacted negatively to deals that were used to solve financial 
distress. 
For European deals after the 2007-08 financial crisis, authors have found higher returns to 
shareholders as compared to acquisitions announced in the pre-crisis period (Rao-Nicholson 
and Salaber 2014b). However, the above study doesn’t look at the banking industry. Beltratti 
and Paladino (2013) on the other hand investigate the effect of the financial crisis on 
European banking mergers and acquisitions and they do not find any significant abnormal 
announcement returns for acquirers. Extant studies related to acquisitions during a crisis are 
based on the premise that foreign investment typically increases in the crisis region through 
the purchase of crisis-afflicted businesses by companies from non-crisis countries (Froot and 
Stein 1991; Krugman 2000; Aguiar and Gopinath 2005; Mody and Negishi 2000). However 
there is limited understanding on how these stylized facts will hold when there is a global 
crisis and when most countries are experiencing economic and financial difficulties. Hence, 
our first question queries how banking acquisitions around the world will perform in face of 
the global crisis. 
Q1. Do banking acquisitions earn abnormal returns for acquirers’ shareholders since 
the financial crisis? 
Emerging from this first question, it would be interesting to investigate the difference in 
abnormal returns between domestic and foreign bank acquisitions – does either of them do 
better than the other after the crisis?  
Similar to general studies on acquisitions, the empirical literature on banking cross-border 
acquisitions has provided mixed results over the years (Amel et al. 2004; DeYoung, Evanoff, 
and Molyneux 2009). Studies using data from the 1990s show that European banks acquiring 
local and foreign banks can achieve significant abnormal returns (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
2000) or no excess returns on average (Rad and Van Beek 1999). On the other hand, a sample 
of deals between 1985-2000 shows that European banks buying domestically achieve positive 
gains, but realize losses while investing abroad (Beitel, Schiereck, and Wahrenburg 2004). 
Campa and Hernando (2006) examine bidders’ returns from acquisitions in 1998-2002 and 
find no evidence of a positive impact on acquirers’ stock price in the cross-border deals, 
whereas domestic deals generate negative and significant returns to acquirers. Using 
acquisitions from 1991-2001, authors find that geographic focus brings positive gains to 
acquirers (Lepetit, Patry, and Rous 2004).  
Several studies show that U.S. banks that buy domestically or abroad experience positive 
returns to their acquisitions (Kiymaz 2004; Desai and Stover 1985; James and Wier 1987; 
Cornett and De 1991). Other studies find that foreign investments generate no or negative 
abnormal returns for U.S. banking acquirers (Waheed and Mathur 1995; Houston and 
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Ryngaert 1994; Cornett and Tehranian 1992; Neely 1987; DeLong 2001). Canadian banks 
which bought internationally in certain related industries experienced significant gains but this 
positive outcome is not applicable to every foreign acquisition (Bessler and Murtagh 2002). 
For example, foreign acquisitions in wealth management and retail banking sectors generated 
value for shareholders, while cross-border acquisitions in the insurance sector failed to do so. 
Given the structural and regulatory factors in the Japanese banking sector where large-scale 
mergers in the late 1990s limited further consolidation of domestic banks (Amel et al. 2004), 
typically, bidders engaging in cross-border acquisitions derived significant abnormal returns 
(Higgins and Beckman 2006). A study using data on banks from 30 countries observed that 
international diversification accrued negative returns to acquirers (Amihud, DeLong, and 
Saunders 2002).  
There are relatively few studies that look at cross-border acquisitions after the recent 
crisis. Cross-border acquisitions in the banking industry have been motivated by several 
theoretical and empirical arguments (Buch and Delong 2012). Most relevant in the context of 
the financial crisis are the information cost and the regulation arguments, both referring to the 
relative efficiency of the acquirer and the target banks. On one side, large and/or efficient 
banks can overcome information costs such as geographic distance, linguistic, cultural and 
legal differences, and succeed in their foreign acquisitions. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) find 
that profit opportunities resulting from the prospect of competing with relatively less efficient 
banks on the domestic market are a key factor affecting international expansion. Hence we 
can expect that the financial crisis, by increasing the gap between more efficient and less 
efficient banks, offered additional opportunities for profitable cross-border acquisitions. On 
the other side, there is evidence that deregulation has a substantial impact on foreign 
investments (Buch and DeLong 2004). Ter Wengel (1995) suggests that the presence of an 
international financial center in the target country makes it more attractive for foreign 
acquirers. Moreover, foreign banks have often found it easy to target banking systems that 
have undergone major privatization programs, such as Spanish banks massively entering the 
Latin American market in the 1990s (Guillén and Tschoegl 2000). Again it is expected that 
the financial crisis had a significant impact on cross-border acquisition activity, as several 
banking systems were deregulated in the years leading up to the 2007-08 crisis. Buch and 
Delong (2012) have speculated that in the post-crisis era deals that were not immediately 
needed to rescue a failing bank have been dropped and banks focused on domestic 
consolidation. Yet, weakening banks in various countries, both developed and developing 
economies, presented opportunities for acquirers to invest in these banks. Beltratti and 
Paladino (2013) mention that national regulators are unlikely to agree to an acquisition if the 
acquirer is short of capital. Thus, banks that acquire abroad after the crisis might indicate to 
markets, at institutional level, political and regulatory patronage, and at firm level, financial 
slack needed to absorb synergies from cross-border target. Hence, our next question focuses 
on whether a cross-border effect will be observed in banking acquisitions in the post-crisis 
world. 
Q2. Do cross-border acquisitions generate higher returns for acquirers’ shareholders as 
compared to domestic deals since the crisis? 
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There are other implications of cross-border acquisitions which we will explore below. 
For example, there are social costs involved with foreign acquisitions (Neuberger 1998) 
which are not immediately realized after an acquisition but might become obvious in the long 
term and greatly impact the local economy. For instance, the change in scope and scale of the 
acquired banks can impact deposits and small business lending as well as introduce 
standardized products and risks at individual and system level (Amel et al. 2004; Ashton 
2012). This might be especially important in emerging economies (EE) where the trade-offs 
between social benefits and potential adverse effects are highly relevant to policymakers and 
governments. Authors have suggested that the presence of foreign-owned banks either 
through acquisitions or greenfield investments in EE have been instrumental in the structural 
change of financial systems in these countries (Mathieson and Roldos 2001; Delfino 2007; 
Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro 2013). 
Authors have implied that there is a need to conduct research on the business entities from 
EE (Purkayastha, Manolova, and Edelman 2012). Even though the trend has evolved over the 
last decade in terms of globalization of financial markets and financial institutions from these 
EE gaining foothold in the global landscape, there is limited insight into the acquisitions by 
these EE banks. Till date very few studies have looked at acquisitions of domestic and foreign 
targets by EE banks (Amihud, DeLong, and Saunders 2002). Though the above study includes 
few banks from emerging economies, understanding differences between the banks from 
developing and developed economies was not the focus of their research. These EE are still 
typically included in international studies as targets for developed-market banks (Amihud, 
DeLong, and Saunders 2002; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 2004). The few studies that exist on 
EE acquirers have suggested that they might not necessarily create value for their 
shareholders (Wright et al. 2005; Contractor, Kumar, and Kundu 2007). Moreover, most 
research on EE diversification is limited to few specific countries such as India, China, Korea, 
few Latin American countries and some transition economies of Eastern Europe (Purkayastha, 
Manolova, and Edelman 2012; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 2004). One study on the 
consolidation across domestic banks during the Asian crisis shows that these acquisitions 
generated negative returns for acquirers’ shareholders (Crouzille, Lepetit, and Bautista 2008). 
Hence, it is pertinent to consider acquisitions by EE banks and query whether they generate 
value for bidders in the short run.  
After the financial crisis, DE banks lost significant market value and large EE banks like 
those from China and Russia, mostly state-owned, had access to cheap capital at home. 
Hence, we argue, these EE banks are able to capitalize on potential opportunities for 
international expansion. Theoretically, as pointed out by Buch and Delong (2012), 
engagement with developed banks improves the efficiency of the developing economy banks. 
Similarly, it can be argued that by acquiring banks in developed economies, EE banks can 
leverage higher levels of development in the financial markets, bank-level efficiency and 
technology for financial gains. Most of these DE are part of international financial center 
network, and thus, making them attractive for EE acquirers (Ter Wengel 1995). Also, many 
developing countries like China undertook deregulation of their banking sector to allow 
foreign investment by their domestic banks (Economist 2012), and at the same time, many 
developed and developing countries began to put in place regulations which invited such 
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investments by EE banks. For example, due to these changes in regulations, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China was able to acquire Standard Bank subsidiary in the UK.  Hence, 
we ask whether, after the crisis, EE banks generate higher shareholder returns than those 
garnered by the shareholders of developed-country banks.  
Q3. Do cross-border acquisitions by EE banks generate higher returns than DE 
bank acquisitions since the crisis? 
Next we look specifically at cross-border acquisitions. We ask if the characteristics of the 
target country matter for acquisitions announced after the crisis, especially with respect to 
characteristics of the acquirer. Extant studies suggest that the incentives for EE firms to 
expand abroad are fundamentally different from those of developed-economy firms (Luo and 
Tung 2007; Buckley et al. 2007; Li 2007; Fortanier and Tulder 2009). For instance, Luo and 
Tung (2007) mention that EE firms that go abroad are driven by asset seeking rather than 
asset exploiting. 
Authors have also argued that geographic diversification is a naturally risk-reducing 
activity (Berger et al. 2000), yet, cross-border deals can increase the insolvency risk exposure 
of home and/or host bank regulators (Amihud, DeLong, and Saunders 2002). Authors have 
argued that by taking its activities into new overseas markets, the acquirer bank is faced with 
increasing monitoring costs and risks (Amihud, DeLong, and Saunders 2002). This is very 
much true for acquisitions into EE where problems like the loan customer base and the 
operating cost structure of the target bank might be hard for acquiring banks to navigate and 
mitigate successfully (Soussa and Wheeler 2006). EE are characterized by higher 
environmental volatility than developed economies (Boisot and Child 1988). Also, studies on 
banking crisis have shown that typically crises in EE are of greater severity than in developed 
economies (Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal 1996; Sheng 1996, 2009). Thus, the target’s home 
country characteristics influence the returns to bank acquisitions with, generally, acquisitions 
of EE banks leading to decrease in developed-country acquirer’s share price. Specifically, 
issues such as operational and political risks as well as legal and cultural constraints are very 
important for stock markets and companies (Soussa and Wheeler 2006; Luo and Peng 1999). 
On the contrary, other studies have found that developed-market targets generate negative 
returns whereas EE acquisitions provide positive returns (Waheed and Mathur 1995; Chari, 
Ouimet, and Tesar 2010).  
With the financial crisis, the relative efficiency of acquirer and target banks strongly 
reflects opportunities for cross-border acquisitions. As the crisis hit more strongly the banking 
sectors of developed countries, EE-DE acquisitions are justified by several factors. On one 
side, EE banks are more competitive than domestic banks when targeting developed 
countries, corresponding to the information cost argument developed above (Focarelli and 
Pozzolo 2005). On the other side, DE and EE banking systems have been deregulated in the 
years leading up to the crisis, and several American and European banks have been bailed out 
as a result; making DE banks more attractive for foreign acquirers, especially large and/or 
efficient EE banks (Buch and DeLong 2004). 
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There is very little research on the success of investments from emerging economies into 
developed countries (Rui and Yip 2008) especially since 2007-08. Few studies that have 
looked at acquisitions by EE firms suggest that shareholders gain when EE companies target 
developed markets (Gubbi et al. 2010). EE firms are likely to benefit from legitimacy and 
brand building in developed economies by acquiring local banks. There are other studies that 
suggest that though large national companies from EE might have the potential to absorb 
technology and assets acquired from developed-market firms, they might not create value for 
their shareholders in the short term (Wright et al. 2005; Contractor, Kumar, and Kundu 2007).  
Also, there is still the unaddressed question of whether EE banks can gain from investing 
in other EE. Extant studies have looked at developed-market banks investing in emerging and 
developed countries, as well as EE banks targeting developed countries. There is no study 
which looks specifically at the returns that EE banks can generate by acquiring other EE 
banks, especially, after the financial crisis. We address these issues via a number of questions. 
We look at cross-border deals based on the economic development of the acquirer and target 
countries (emerging-economy to emerging-economy (EE-EE), emerging-economy to 
developed-economy (EE-DE), developed-economy to emerging-economy (DE-EE), and 
developed-economy to developed-economy (DE-DE)). 
Q4. Do cross-border acquisitions generate different returns since the crisis 
depending on the acquirer-target’s country of origin? 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Event study 
The first step in our analysis is to conduct an event study that is calculating and examining 
bidder’s abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement. Event study methodology is 
very common in mergers and acquisitions literature (Hosken and Simpson 2001; Diepold et 
al. 2008; Nicholson and Salaber 2013; Rao-Nicholson and Salaber 2014a) where the 









where ARi is firm i’s abnormal return at day . The event window [t, T] represents the time 
window around the acquisition announcement during which stock prices are allowed to react 
to the announcement. In developed countries where stock markets are efficient, this period is 
very small and scholars usually calculate CAR over the window [-1; +1]. In emerging 
countries however it is necessary to increase this window to allow stock prices to fully reflect 
the news of the announcement. Emerging-market studies calculate event windows up to 11 
days before and after the announcement, but because our sample includes both DE and EE 
companies, we calculate CAR over an [-2; +2] event window. 
The expected return for each bidder is estimated according to the traditional market 
model (MacKinlay 1997): 
9 
 
,  imiii RR                        
where, Ri is the daily return on the acquirer, Rm is the daily return on the acquirer’s national 
market portfolio, and all returns are converted to dollar returns. The estimation period runs 
from 90 to 30 days before announcement date. The estimated coefficients i and i  are then 
used to forecast the abnormal returns over each 5-day event window. The difference between 
the actual return and the expected return from the market model gives the daily abnormal 
stock return: 
  miiii RRAR
  .         
In order to answer our different research questions, we calculate CAR for each individual 
deal and then average them by sub-group (e.g. domestic vs. cross-border deals) and by sub-
period (pre- and post-crisis). Post-crisis corresponds to the period starting after the global 
stock market meltdown, i.e., from April 2009. 
3.2. Empirical model 
The second step in our analysis is to regress these abnormal returns on several explanatory 
and control variables. A standard OLS estimation method was used and White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented throughout the analysis. In order to 
answer Q1, we create a dummy for the post-crisis period, i.e., POSTCRISIS = 1 for the period 
April 2009-December 2012, 0 before. For Q2, we create another dummy, CB, equal to one 
when the deal occurs between two institutions from different countries, and we calculate the 
interaction term CB*POSTCRISIS. To test Q3, we interact POSTCRISIS with another 
dummy variable, EEBID = 1 when the acquirer is located in an emerging economy, 0 
otherwise. Finally, we create additional dummies indicating the direction of the transaction: 
EE-EE and EE-DE for acquisitions from emerging countries to emerging and developed 
economies respectively, and DE-EE and DE-DE for transactions originating in a developed 
country and targeting emerging and developed economies respectively. To answer Q4, we 
interact each of these dummies with POSTCRISIS. Q1 and Q2 are tested over the entire 
sample of domestic and cross-border deals, whereas Q3 and Q4 are tested over the sample of 
foreign acquisitions only. 
In order to assess the impact of each explanatory variable on CAR, we need to control for 
relevant deal-specific and bidder-specific characteristics. Deal-specific variables that are 
likely to impact short-term returns include the size of the transaction, the mode of payment, 
the percentage acquired in the transaction, the public status of the target and the industry 
relatedness (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004; Faccio and Masulis 2005; Beitel, 
Schiereck, and Wahrenburg 2004; Campa and Kedia 2002; Goergen and Renneboog 2004; 
Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi in press). The size of the transaction is measured using the 
relative size (RELATIVESIZE) which is calculated as the deal value divided by the bidder’s 
market value. CASH is a dummy equal to one if the deal is entirely cash-financed, zero 
otherwise. PERCACQ is the percentage of shares acquired in the transaction. 
PRIVATETARGET = 1 if the target is a private company, zero otherwise. SAMEIND is a 
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dummy representing the industry relatedness of the bidder and the target, i.e., SAMEIND=1 if 
both belong to the financial sector. Bidder-specific control variables relevant for banking 
acquisitions are the acquirer’s price-to-book ratio (PTB), debt-to-equity ratio 
(DEBTEQUITYRATIO), total assets (LOGASSETS as we take the logarithm) and return on 
equity (ROE).  
In the cross-border analysis, we also include several country-level variables to control for 
the economic, fiscal and financial development of the bidder and target countries (Gubbi et al. 
2010; Meyer et al. 2009). For the acquirer country, we use MARKETCAP/GDP(A) which 
measures the level of development of the national stock market; BANKCAP/ASSET(A) 
measuring the strength of the banking system and ATTGLOB(A) which represents the 
attitude of society toward globalization. For the target, we control for the level of fiscal 
freedom (FISCFREEDOM), investment freedom (INVFREEDOM), corruption index 
(CORRUPTINDEX) in the country, the number of commercial bank branches 
(LOGBRANCH as we take the logarithm), inflation rates (INFLATION) and GDP growth 
rate (GDPGROWTH). 
 
4. Data  
4.1. Data Selection 
Our data includes all banking acquisitions around the world (both domestic and cross-
border) that were announced between January 2004 and December 2012. All deal information 
was collected from Thomson One; this includes the deal value, the percentage acquired, the 
country and industry of each acquirer and target, the public status of the acquirer and the 
target, and the mode of payment. To be included in the sample, each deal has to meet the 
following criteria: the acquirer is a publicly traded financial institution; the deal value is 
available and greater than $1 million; and the transaction is a majority stake acquisition. Daily 
financial data, including acquirer’s stock returns, market capitalization, price-to-book ratio, as 
well as market returnsi, were collected from Thomson DataStream. We also obtained from 
DataStream several acquirers’ accounting variables such as total assets, debt-to-equity ratio, 
and return on equity (ROE). The market capitalization-to-GDP ratio, bank capital-to-assets 
ratio, number of commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults) and GDP growth rates were 
collected from the World Bank. The indices of fiscal freedom and investment freedom were 
downloaded from the Heritage Foundation. The corruption index was obtained from 
Euromonitor International. The index of attitude toward globalization is from the IMD WCY 
executive survey, and inflation rates are from the IMF. Table 1 provides the definition and 
source of all variables used in this paper. 
[Table 1 about here] 
After merging all the data, our final sample consists of 883 acquisitions from 75 
countries, including 151 deals (17%) initiated from EE banks. Overall, domestic acquisitions 
represent 83% of the sample, and two third of them occurred within the U.S. The exact 
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distribution of deals per country is presented in Table 2. Panels A, B, C and D show DE-DE, 
EE-EE, DE-EE and EE-DE acquisitions respectively. 
[Table 2 about here] 
4.2. Data Description 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our sample of deals. Panel A reports, by sub-
period, the average, median and standard deviation for our key variables. The average CAR 
went from negative in the pre-crisis and crisis periods to positive after the crisis. The average 
and median deal value was highest during the 2007-08 crisis and was very low in the post-
crisis period. However the relative size of the average transaction doubled after the crisis, 
suggesting that smaller banks were acquiring relatively larger targets. Finally, the return on 
equity decreased for acquisitions announced after the crisis. Panel B shows the total deal 
value (in $ million) and total number of deals by sub-group and sub-period. Overall, the 
number of deals has largely decreased across the globe since the financial crisis. Only the 
number of acquisitions from EE to DE has had a small drop, although this number is very 
small (8 before and 6 after the crisis). In the pre-crisis period, acquisitions from EE banks 
represented 2% of the domestic sample and cross-border sample in terms of total deal value. 
After the crisis, these figures jumped to 20% and 5% respectively. As a matter of fact, the 
total deal value of EE-EE transactions has significantly increased in the domestic (+41%) and 
experienced the small drop among all cross-border (-19%) samples. The figure for EE-EE 
domestic transactions go against the general trend of a global downward shift in acquisition 
activity since 2007-08. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 provides the correlation coefficients – and statistical significance – among all our 
variables. Panel A shows coefficients across the entire sample of domestic and cross-border 
deals, whereas Panel B reports correlation coefficients for the cross-border sample only, 
hence including all relevant country-level variables. In both panels, CAR is negatively 
correlated with the size of the bank (LOGASSETS). In Panel A, LOGASSETS is positively 
and significantly correlated with CB (0.52). Similarly, LOGBRANCH in Panel B is 
significantly correlated with DE-DE and INFLATION, and we address this issue in section 5. 
Similarly, CORRUPTINDEX is highly correlated with EE-EE (negatively), DE-DE 
(positively) and INVFREEDOM (positively) variables. We account for these significant 
correlations in the robustness section. 
[Table 4 about here] 
5. Results 
Table 5 shows the number of deals and average CAR by year from 2004 to 2012. The 
CAR becomes positive (significant at the 10% level) in 2009. This is consistent with the idea 
that banks can earn positive abnormal returns in their post-crisis acquisitions. However the 
significance disappears after 2009 and more analysis is needed to fully understand the returns 
derived by acquiring banks after the financial crisis. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
Results for the event study are presented in Table 6. CAR[-2;+2] are averaged for 
different sub-periods and for various categories of deals, depending on which question we are 
trying to answer. For each question, we performed Student tests to compare the statistical 
difference between average CARs.  
Panel A shows evidence for Q1, as banking acquisitions in general performed better after 
the crisis than before, even though the difference in CAR between the two periods is not 
statistically significant. Panel B seeks to answer Q2 by comparing abnormal returns of 
domestic and cross-border deals in the post-crisis period. Both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions perform better after the crisis than before, and the difference in CARs between 
domestic and cross-border deals in the post-crisis period is not statistically significant. In 
Panel C, we compare the CARs between EE acquirers and DE acquirers in the post-crisis 
period to answer Q3. Again the difference is not statistically significant, although EE banks 
earn positive abnormal returns after the crisis. Panels D and E allow us to investigate Q4. On 
one side, previous result that EE banks performed better after the crisis is driven by their 
acquisitions into DE. On the other side, the negative abnormal return for DE acquirers in 
period 1 is driven by DE-DE transactions. Overall, banks earn more for their shareholders 
when targeting countries with different economic development, and all returns increase 
(although not significantly) in the post-crisis period. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Previous results are preliminary as based on univariate analysis. In order to truly compare 
the performance of different types of deals before and after the crisis, we need to control for 
other potential factors affecting the short-term performance of acquisitions. The results of 
such cross-sectional analysis are presented in Tables 7 and 8. In Table 7, we control for firm-
specific and deal-specific characteristics across the entire sample of domestic and cross-
border deals, which allows us to investigate Q1 and Q2. Estimates for our explanatory 
variables are consistent with the univariate analysis presented above. First, banking 
acquisitions on average perform better after the crisis than before. In model (2), POSTCRISIS 
is significant at 1% level. Second, overall cross-border deals do not offer any abnormal return 
relative to domestic deals in the post-crisis period. We also observe that CASH is positive and 
significant at 10% level. This is in line with literature that indicates that cash-financed deals 
can improve profitability (Ghosh 2001; Linn and Switzer 2001). RELATIVESIZE is positive 
and significant at 1% level. Martynova et al. (2007) suggest that acquisitions of relatively 
large targets are likely to bring operating and financial advantages. Also, this result is 
consistent with more information and fewer adverse selection problems (Conn et al. 2005; 
Goldberg and Johnson 1990). PTB is positive and significant at 1% level. Thus, bidders 
earning a very high return on their assets indicate the acquirer’s growth opportunities (Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling 1991; Moeller and Schlingemann 2004) and play an important role in 
explaining the cross-section of acquirer returns.    
[Table 7 about here] 
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In Table 8, we examine Q3 and Q4 by focusing on cross-border deals only and 
controlling for additional, country-level, variables. We find no evidence for EE bidders’ 
superior performance in the post-crisis period (Q3). Turning to Q4, estimates are again 
consistent with the event study. Looking at EE banks, they generate extra returns in their post-
crisis acquisitions into developed countries. Post-crisis EE-DE abnormal returns are 
significantly positive at the 5% level. Turning now to DE acquirers, we do not find any 
significant difference of CAR between the two periods, for both DE-DE and DE-EE. With the 
introduction of additional control variables, deal-specific and bidder-specific variables have a 
lower impact on CAR (as compared to Table 6), and other country-level variables help 
explain the cross-sectional difference in CARs. CORRUPTINDEX is negative and significant 
in models (1)-(3). Since the corruption index is higher for non/less corrupt countries, the 
significant coefficients mean that acquirer’s shareholders react negatively to acquisitions 
targeting less corrupt nations. INFLATION is negative and significant in all models. Authors 
have observed that inflation can affect the flexibility of loan rates and liquidity in the financial 
markets (Cottarelli and Kourelis 1994). Thus, when acquirers buy firms in high inflation 
countries, the market might react to this by undervaluing such acquisitions.  
[Table 8 about here] 
Overall, we find evidence that the financial crisis had an impact on the performance of 
acquisitions in the banking sector, but it impacted differently cross-border deals from EE and 
DE acquirers. Our results are summarized in Table 9. First, the crisis had a positive impact, on 
average, on the short-term performance of bank acquisitions. Second, looking at the economic 
development of the acquirer, EE banks and DE banks reacted differently to the crisis: DE 
acquirers earned negative returns after the crisis whereas EE bidders earned positive and 
significant returns in the post-crisis period. Third, looking at the economic development of the 
target, we are able to highlight further differences in CAR: EE bidders outperformed in their 
EE-DE acquisitions in the post-crisis period. 
[Table 9 about here] 
5.1. Robustness Checks  
In this section we perform a series of robustness checks to validate our findings. First, we 
drop from our regressions the crisis period data, which corresponds to stock market crashes 
around the world (i.e., we deleted 111 deals between October 2007 and March 2009). This 
analysis generates results which are similar to those reported above. Second, in Table 7, we 
drop LOGASSETS as it is correlated with CB. We observe that CB*POSTCRISIS is still 
insignificant. Also, in Table 8, we drop LOGBRANCH as it is correlated with DE-DE. Again 
we find that DE-DE*POSTCRISIS is still insignificant. Similarly, we remove other correlated 
variables from our analysis and observe that our results are not significantly different from 
those that are presented. Third, other measures of country differences were used in Table 8 
instead of GDP growth rate. We replaced the variable GDPGROWTH(T) with 
GDPPERCAPITA(T) and GNIPERCAPITA(T) which indicate the per capita GDP and GNI 
in the target country. Again these modifications do not alter our results. Finally, we tried 
different definitions of CAR by changing the length of the event window, the estimation 
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model, as well as the market index used to calculated abnormal returns. On one side, we 
allowed the event window to vary from [-1; +1] to [-7;+7] to account for different levels of 
market efficiency across different markets. On the other side, we calculated abnormal returns 
in excess of the local stock market index instead of the MSCI country index (although some 
countries don’t have a local market index). Moreover, instead of using the market model to 
compute abnormal returns, we estimated the modified market model used in several event 
studies (Nicholson and Salaber 2013; Rao-Nicholson and Salaber 2014b; Bouwman, Fuller, 
and Nain 2009; Brown and Warner 1985), where abnormal returns at day  are equal to the 
difference between bidder returns and market returns: ARi  = Ri  – Rm. Overall, our results 
are consistent, and sometimes stronger, under different specifications of CAR. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we look at shareholder returns to bank acquisitions before and after the 
financial crisis of 2007-08. Using a worldwide sample of 883 deals from 2004-2012 and 
standard event study method, we investigate the impact of the crisis on the performance of 
different bank acquisitions. Based on existing, and mostly conflicting, evidence, we pose 
several interesting questions with regard to the nature of the transactions (domestic vs. cross-
border) and the level of economic development of the acquirer and target countries. 
We focus on the banking sector as it provides an interesting avenue for research – it is the 
industry which forms the locus of the 2007-08 crisis; and hence, it will be fascinating to 
observe how the wealth of shareholders changes under developing economic downturn. 
During the global financial upheaval, two trends were observed in the banking industry, one, 
domestically, banks consolidated their position through acquisitions, and two, in terms of 
cross-border acquisitions, banks from emerging economies acquired larger banks in 
developed markets. The domestic deals were mediated and encouraged in several developed 
economies due to what Molyneux et al. (2014) identify as ‘too-big-to-fail’ and ‘too-
systemically-important-to-fail’ issues. Unlike previous financial crises which originated from 
developing countries, the recent financial crisis was created due to imbalances in the 
developed-economy banking industry. Hence, during the years after the crisis, we observe a 
reversal of previous trends and the global acquisitions was driven by emerging-economy 
banks like those from China, Russia, Brazil, Malaysia and Qatar. In this study, we consider 
bidder banks around the world, thus, examining if the abnormal returns are localized with 
developing country shareholders or if we can generalize our results to banks around the world.  
Our results provide new insights into the performance of bank acquisitions as we 
investigate the impact of the financial crisis at the global level. First, domestic acquisitions, 
especially in developed countries, seem to perform better after the crisis than before. Second, 
among cross-border deals, we observe that only a very small number derive value for the 
acquirer’s shareholders since the crisis. Companies from emerging economies that buy in 
developed countries generate positive and significant returns for their shareholders. Most of 
the other transactions undertaken in the post-crisis period do not provide abnormal returns to 
investors. Thus, this study provides evidence to the futility of acquisitions and adds another 
chapter in the discourse on whether acquisitions are necessary evils and whether companies 
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need to engage in the acquisition strategy more cautiously. Avenues for future research would 
be, for example, to investigate the performance of post-crisis bank acquisitions based on their 
investment strategy, i.e., was the acquisition driven by an undervaluation of the (crisis-




i For homogeneity, we collected MSCI indices for each relevant country. As a robustness 
check, we also calculated abnormal returns using local indices, e.g. DAX30 for Germany, 
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Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
Variable name Definition Source 
POSTCRISIS Dummy = 1 if announcement date after March 2009 Authors’ calculation 
CB Dummy = 1 if cross-border deal Authors’ calculation 
EEBID Dummy = 1 if bidder located in emerging economy Khanna and Palepu (2010) 
EE-EE Dummy = 1 if bidder and target located in emerging economies Khanna and Palepu (2010) 
EE-DE 
Dummy = 1 if bidder located in emerging 
economy and target located in 
developed economy 
Khanna and Palepu (2010) 
DE-DE Dummy = 1 if bidder and target located in developed economies Khanna and Palepu (2010) 
DE-EE 
Dummy = 1 if bidder located in developed 
economy and target located in 
emerging economy 
Khanna and Palepu (2010) 
CASH Dummy = 1 if cash-financed deal Thomson One 
DEALVALUE Value of the transaction in $million Thomson One 
PERCACQ Percentage of shares acquired in the transaction Thomson One 
SAMEIND Dummy = 1 if target same industry as 
bidder
Thomson One 
PRIVATETARGET Dummy = 1 if private target Thomson One 
RELATIVESIZE Deal value divided by bidder's market value Authors’ calculation 
DEBTEQUITYRATIO Bidder's debt-to-equity ratio Thomson DataStream 
PTB Bidder's price-to-book ratio Thomson DataStream 
LOGASSETS Log of bidder's total assets in $million Thomson DataStream
ROE Bidder's return on equity Thomson DataStream 
MARKETCAP/GDP(A) Bidder country's market capitalisation to 
GDP ratio
World Bank 
BANKCAP/ASSET(A) Bidder country's bank capital-to-assets ratio World Bank 
ATTGLOB(A) Bidder country's index of attitude toward globalization IMD WCY executive survey 
FISCFREEDOM(T) Target country's index of fiscal freedom Heritage Foundation 
INVFREEDOM(T) Target country's index of investment 
freedom
Heritage Foundation 
CORRUPTINDEX(T) Target country’s index of corruption Euromonitor International 
LOGBRANCH(T) 
Log of number of commercial bank 
branches (per 100,000 adults) in the 
target country 
World Bank 
INFLATION(T) Target country’s inflation rate IMF 
GDPGROWTH(T) Target country’s GDP growth World Bank 
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Table 2: Number of deals by acquirer and target country 
Panel A: DE-DE Target's country (DE)   

























AT Austria 1 1 
AU Australia 18 18 
BE Belgium 1 1 
CA Canada 9 1 5 15 
CH Switzerland 2 1 1 4 8 
DE Germany 6 1 7 
DK Denmark 8 1 1 10 
ES Spain 12 2 1 6 21 
FI Finland 1 1 2 
FR France 1 2 2 1 6 
GB United Kingdom 5 2 3 10 
GG Guernsey 0 
GR Greece 5 5 
IE Ireland 1 1 1 3 
IL Israel 1 2 3 
IM Isle of Man 0 
IS Iceland 1 2 1 1 1 6 
IT Italy 1 24 25 
JP Japan 35 1 36 
LI Liechtenstein 1 1 
LU Luxembourg 0 
MC Monaco 0 
NL Netherlands 1 1 2 
NO Norway 5 1 6 
PR Puerto Rico 1 1 2 
PT Portugal 2 2 
SE Sweden 3 1 1 5 10 
SG Singapore 2 2 
US United States 1 1 483 485 




Panel B: EE-EE Target's country (EE)   

























AE Utd Arab Emirates 3 2 1 6 
AL Albania 0 
AR Argentina 4 4 
BA Bosnia 0 
BB Barbados 0 
BG Bulgaria 1 1 
BH Bahrain 1 1 2 
BR Brazil 3 3 
BY Belarus 0 
CD Dem Rep Congo 0 
CL Chile 1 1 
CN China 3 1 1 5 
CO Colombia 2 1 3 
CZ Czech Republic 2 2 
EE Estonia 0 
EG Egypt 0 
HK Hong Kong 1 6 7 
HR Croatia 1 1 
HU Hungary 1 1 1 3 
ID Indonesia 8 8 
IN India 2 5 1 8 
IQ Iraq 0 
KR South Korea 11 11 
KW Kuwait 1 1 2 1 5 
KZ Kazakhstan 0 
LB Lebanon 0 
LT Lithuania 2 2 
MA Morocco 1 1 2 
MK Macedonia 0 
MO Macau 0 
MX Mexico 2 2 
MY Malaysia 1 5 1 7 
OM Oman 1 1 
PA Panama 0 
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PE Peru 1 3 4 
PH Philippines 7 7 
PK Pakistan 2 2 
PL Poland 2 1 3 
QA Qatar 1 1 
RO Romania 0 
RS Serbia & Mont. 0 
RU Russian Fed 1 1 5 1 8 
SA Saudi Arabia 0 
SV El Salvador 0 
TH Thailand 16 16 
TR Turkey 1 3 4 
TT Trinidad & Tob. 0 
TW Taiwan 5 5 
UA Ukraine 0 
VE Venezuela 1 1 
ZA South Africa 1 1 2 





Panel C: DE-EE Target's country (EE)   

























AT Austria 1 1 1 2 2 7 
AU Australia 1 1 
CA Canada 1 1 2 
CH Switzerland 2 2 
CY Cyprus 1 2 3 
DE Germany 1 1 
ES Spain 1 1 1 3 
FR France 1 1 2 
GB United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
GR Greece 2 1 2 1 6 
IE Ireland 1 1 
IL Israel 1 1 2 
IT Italy 1 1 1 3 
NL Netherlands 1 1 
NO Norway 1 1 
SE Sweden 1 1 1 1 4 






Panel D: EE-DE Target's country (DE)   

























BH Bahrain 1 1 
BR Brazil 1 1 
CN China 1 1 2 
KW Kuwait 1 1 
LB Lebanon 1 1 
MX Mexico 1 1 
MY Malaysia 1 1 
QA Qatar 2 1 3 
RU Russian Fed 1 1 
TR Turkey 1 1 
TW Taiwan 1 1 




Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A 
  Full period   Pre-crisis   Crisis   Post-crisis 
  (n= 883)   (n=504)   (n=111)   (n=268) 
  Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D. 
CAR[-2;+2](%) 0.0037 -0.4 6.65   -0.2392 -0.41 4.84  -0.2570 -0.53 7.12  0.5685 -0.255 8.98 
CB 0.1676 0 0.37   0.1587 0 0.36  0.2072 0 0.41  0.1679 0 0.37 
EEBID 0.1710 0 0.37   0.1269 0 0.33  0.1531 0 0.36  0.2611 0 0.44 
CASH 0.2525 0 0.43   0.2380 0 0.43  0.2882 0 0.45  0.2649 0 0.44 
DEALVALUE 706.10 70 3466.76   782.5794 65 3733.74  1256.216 90 5502.64  334.4403 70 829.59 
PERCACQ(%) 93.3601 100 16.48   94.5436 100 14.67  94.2162 100 14.37  90.7798 100 19.92 
SAMEIND 0.8878 1 0.32   1 1 0  1 1 0  0.6305 1 0.48 
PRIVATETARGET 0.3318 0 0.47   0.3869 0 0.49  0.2342 0 0.43  0.2686 0 0.44 
RELATIVESIZE 0.2391 0.0684 1.57   0.1910 0.0740 0.53  0.1784 0.0624 0.2392  0.3567 0.0578 2.76 
DEBTEQUITYRATIO 3.1744 1.6335 7.03   3.1186 1.7361 4.48  3.7754 2.0037 4.7698  3.0303 1.2909 10.77 
PTB 1.6307 1.53 0.77   1.8787 1.745 0.65  1.4988 1.31 0.7420  1.2090 1.06 0.81 
LOGASSETS 16.3909 16.02 2.36   16.0548 15.6387 2.32  16.9438 17.0969 2.61  16.8034 16.4856 2.23 





Panel B  
  
Full period 
Period 1 Period 2 Growth rate 
Period 1 vs 





















Domestic 491857 79% 735 83% 304054 77% 424 84% 118664 85% 88 79% 69139 77% 223 83% -84% -56% 
DEBID 
DE-DE 460603 74% 628 71% 295263 75% 380 75% 114501 82% 76 68% 50838 57% 172 64% -88% -62% 
EEBID 
EE-EE 31255 5% 107 12% 8791 2% 44 9% 4163 3% 12 11% 18301 20% 51 19% 41% -9% 
CB 131706 21% 148 17% 90429 23% 80 16% 20748 15% 23 21% 20529 23% 45 17% -82% -56% 
DEBID 118836 19% 104 12% 84317 21% 60 12% 18870 14% 18 16% 15649 17% 26 10% -85% -67% 
DE-DE 90153 10% 59 7% 63103 16% 30 6% 13785 10% 9 8% 13265 15% 20 7% -83% -49% 
DE-EE 28683 5% 45 5% 21214 5% 30 6% 5085 4% 9 8% 2384 3% 6 2% -91% -85% 
EEBID 12870 2% 44 5% 6112 2% 20 4% 1879 1% 5 5% 4880 5% 19 7% -39% -24% 
EE-DE 4347 1% 14 2% 1787 0.5% 6 1% 1506 1% 2 2% 1055 1% 6 2% -68% -25% 
EE-EE 8523 1% 30 3% 4325 1% 14 3% 373 0.3% 3 3% 3825 4% 13 5% -19% -24% 





Table 4: Pearson correlation coefficients  
Panel A: Total sample 
n=883 CAR[-2;+2] 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10  11   
1 POSTCRISIS 0.0561 * 
2 CB -0.0217 -0.031 
3 EEBID 0.0101 0.170 *** 0.126 ***
4 CASH 0.0410 0.024 0.090 *** 0.027
5 PERCACQ -0.0154 -0.069 ** -0.177 *** -0.273 *** -0.022
6 SAMEIND -0.0292 -0.538 *** 0.065 ** -0.007 0.003 -0.031
7 PRIVATETARGET 0.0200 -0.096 *** -0.050 * -0.067 ** 0.025 0.041 -0.009 
8 RELATIVESIZE -0.0058 0.050 * -0.063 ** -0.018 0.018 0.024 0.004 0.013
9 DEBTEQUITYRATIO 0.0111 -0.054 * 0.256 *** -0.113 *** 0.0004 -0.086 *** 0.112 *** -0.027 -0.016
10 PTB 0.0807 ** -0.352 *** 0.167 *** 0.047 -0.020 0.041 0.244 *** 0.089 *** -0.097 *** 0.015
11 LOGASSETS -0.0561 * 0.065 ** 0.519 *** 0.043 0.065 ** -0.244 *** 0.069 ** -0.220 *** -0.239 *** 0.326 *** 0.057 *
12 ROE -0.1380 *** -0.141 *** 0.116 *** 0.078 ** -0.020   0.002   0.060 ** 0.049   -0.076 ** -0.020   0.020  0.101 ***




Panel B: Cross-border sample 
n=148 CAR[-2;+2] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 POSTCRISIS 0.1176 
2 EE-EE -0.0209 0.1603 ** 
3 EE-DE 0.2027 * 0.1627 ** -0.1272 * 
4 DE-DE -0.1428 * 0.0281 -0.3825 *** -0.2471 ***
5 DE-EE 0.0414 -0.2470 *** -0.3138 *** -0.203 *** -0.6094 ***
6 CASH 0.0375 -0.0567 0.0524 0.003 -0.0770  0.0381    
7 PERCACQ -0.0374 0.0988 -0.1083 * 0.046 0.2185 *** -0.1697 *** 0.0696   
8 SAMEIND -0.0537 -0.4465 *** -0.1183 * -0.122 * -0.0213  0.1838 *** 0.1083 * -0.0525   
9 PRIVATETARGET 0.0621 -0.107 0.025 -0.003 -0.1810 *** 0.172 *** -0.061  -0.081  0.048    
10 RELATIVESIZE -0.0130 0.032 -0.024 0.094 0.0556  -0.093  0.006  0.052  0.040  -0.088   
11 DEBTEQUITYRATIO -0.0315 -0.242 *** -0.360 *** -0.237 *** 0.3534 *** 0.045  -0.043  0.078  0.173 *** -0.050  -0.031  
12 PTB 0.0915 -0.314 *** 0.127 * -0.059 -0.0976  0.035  0.025  0.038  0.161 ** 0.060  0.127 * 
13 LOGASSETS -0.1374 * 0.060 -0.388 *** -0.164 ** 0.2584 *** 0.122 * 0.091  0.098  0.074  -0.124 * -0.259 ***
14 ROE 0.0021 -0.242 *** 0.082 0.015 -0.0828  0.014  0.054  0.014  0.015  0.083  -0.329 ***
15 MARKETCAP/GDP(A) -0.0427 -0.031 -0.189 *** -0.110 0.2916 *** -0.106  0.020  0.091  0.017  -0.117 * -0.131 * 
16 BANKCAP/ASSET(A) 0.1239 0.212 *** 0.368 *** 0.289 *** -0.2330 *** -0.144 ** -0.090  -0.049  -0.194 *** 0.030  0.074  
17 ATTGLOB(A) 0.0853 0.168 ** 0.017 0.088 0.1167 * -0.177 ** 0.024  0.182 *** -0.162 ** -0.065  0.016  
18 FISCFREEDOM(T) 0.0081 0.183 ** 0.386 *** -0.049 -0.4959 *** 0.334 *** 0.135 * -0.150 * -0.115  0.035  -0.092  
19 INVFREEDOM(T) 0.0319 0.139 * -0.421 *** 0.165 ** 0.5106 *** -0.415 *** 0.057  0.273 *** -0.017  -0.101  -0.007  
20 CORRUPTINDEX(T) -0.0117  -0.0052  -0.5100 *** 0.2470 *** 0.5880 *** -0.5040 *** 0.0476  0.2280 *** 0.0344  -0.0671  0.0915  
21 LOGBRANCH(T) 0.0244 0.0924 -0.3217 *** 0.0114  0.4459 *** -0.2855 *** -0.0921  0.1146  0.0027  -0.0906  -0.0191  
22 INFLATION(T) -0.0371 -0.1591 ** 0.3350 *** -0.1541 ** -0.5677 *** 0.4742 *** 0.0671  -0.1135  0.1094  0.2441 *** -0.0516  
23 GDPGROWTH(T) -0.007 -0.052 0.1909 -0.1117  -0.4465 *** 0.4368 *** 0.0017  -0.1305 * 0.0518  0.1007  -0.1296 * 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B (continued) 
n=148 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  21  22 
11 DEBTEQUITYRATIO                  
12 PTB 0.057   
13 LOGASSETS 0.351 *** -0.228 ***   
14 ROE -0.109 * -0.351 *** -0.060   
15 MARKETCAP/GDP(A) 0.270 *** 0.268 *** 0.184 *** 0.107   
16 BANKCAP/ASSET(A) -0.424 *** 0.068 -0.418 *** 0.111 -0.133 *   
17 ATTGLOB(A) 0.063 0.016 -0.176 ** 0.022 0.324 *** 0.179 **   
18 FISCFREEDOM(T) -0.210 *** 0.066 -0.046 -0.011 0.009 0.087 0.008   
19 INVFREEDOM(T) 0.147 * -0.091 0.196 ** 0.020 0.084 0.056 0.042 -0.253 ***   
20 CORRUPTINDEX(T) 0.1561 * -0.0179  0.0198  0.0082  0.0352  0.0166  0.2016 ** -0.4257 *** 0.7505 ***      
21 LOGBRANCH(T) 0.1554 ** -0.2503 *** 0.2490 *** -0.2225 *** 0.0901 ** -0.2125 ** -0.1702 ** -0.2251 *** 0.2439 *** -0.0402 *** 
22 INFLATION(T) -0.1962 *** 0.1723 ** -0.2035 *** 0.1961 *** -0.2391 ** 0.0133 -0.1478 * 0.4460 *** -0.5608 *** -0.6935 *** -0.4608 ***
23 GDPGROWTH(T) -0.1428 ** 0.3232 *** -0.2480 *** 0.1983 *** 0.0042 0.0870 0.0116 0.3389 *** -0.3937 -0.3937 *** -0.4036 *** 0.3767 *** 




Table 5: Cumulative abnormal returns by year 
Year Nb deals CAR[-2;+2] 
2004 140 -0.24%   
2005 126 -0.30%   
2006 147 -0.37%   
2007 115 0.18%   
2008 77 -0.98%   
2009 58 2.23% * 
2010 69 -0.81%   
2011 77 1.25%   






Table 6: Event study analysis 
    Full period   
Period 1  
(pre-crisis + crisis)   
Period 2 
(post-crisis)   
Difference  
(2-1) 
Panel A: All deals 
0.00% -0.24% 0.57% 0.81% 
(883) (615) (268)
Panel B: Domestic vs. cross-border 
Domestic 0.07% -0.18% 0.65% 0.83% 
(735) (512) (223)
Cross-border -0.32% -0.53% ** 0.17% 0.71% 
(148) (103) (45)
Difference -0.39% -0.35% -0.47%
Panel C: DE vs. EE bidder (cross-border deals)
DE bidder -0.52% **  -0.56% **  -0.38%   0.18% 
(104)   (78)   (26)    
EE bidder 0.16%   -0.44%   0.93% *  1.37% 
(44)   (25)   (19)    
Difference 0.67%   0.12%   1.32%    
          
Panel D: DE bidders (cross-border deals) 
DE-DE -0.80% **  -0.93% **  -0.56%   0.37% 
(59)   (39)   (20)    
DE-EE -0.14%   -0.20%   0.21%   0.40% 
(45)   (39)   (6)    
Difference 0.66%   0.73%   0.76%    
Panel E: EE bidders (cross-border deals) 
EE-DE 1.41%   0.50%   2.63% **  2.14% 
(14)   (8)   (6)    
EE-EE -0.43%   -0.88%   0.15%   1.03% 
(30)   (17)   (13)    
Difference   -1.84%   -1.37%   -2.48% **     





Table 7: Regression estimates on the total sample (Q1-Q2)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
POSTCRISIS 0.00811* 0.0166***  0.0170*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00621)  (0.0065) 
CB   -0.00195  
   (0.00700)  
CB*POSTCRISIS    -0.0022 
    (0.0112) 
CASH  0.00957* 0.00979* 0.0095* 
  (0.00522) (0.00526) (0.0052) 
PERCACQ  -0.0102 -0.0137 -0.0101 
  (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
SAMEIND  -0.000915 -0.0128* -0.0007 
  (0.00869) (0.00751) (0.0087) 
PRIVATETARGET  0.00291 0.00195 0.0029 
  (0.00496) (0.00497) (0.0049) 
RELATIVESIZE  0.0161*** 0.0158*** 0.016*** 
  (0.00522) (0.00524) (0.0052) 
DEBTEQUITYRATIO  0.000254 0.000253 0.0002 
  (0.000336) (0.000338) (0.0003) 
PTB  0.0118*** 0.00967*** 0.0117*** 
  (0.00315) (0.00309) (0.0031) 
LOGASSETS  -0.00188* -0.00138 -0.0018 
  (0.00109) (0.00119) (0.0011) 
Constant -0.00242 0.00977 0.0245 0.0087 
 (0.00268) (0.0268) (0.0271) (0.0011) 
Observations 883 863 863 863 
R-squared 0.003 0.036 0.028 0.0363 
Adj. R-squared 0.0020 0.0261 0.0180 0.0250 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 8: Regression estimates on the cross-border sample (Q3-Q4)  





EE-EE  -0.0294  
-0.0218 
EE-EE*POSTCRISIS  -0.0148  
-0.0322 
EE-DE  0.0292  
-0.0234 
EE-DE*POSTCRISIS  0.0610**  
-0.0279 
DE-EE  0.0138  
-0.0124 
DE-EE*POSTCRISIS  0.0209  
-0.0226 
DE-DE  -0.0335** 
-0.0138 
DE-DE*POSTCRISIS  0.0078 
-0.0147 
CASH 0.0060 0.0105 0.0074 0.0073 0.0059 
-0.0092 -0.0090 -0.0087 -0.0086 -0.0086 
PERCACQ -0.0278 -0.0222 -0.0062 -0.0213 -0.0188 
-0.0207 -0.0197 -0.0217 -0.0210 -0.0230 
SAMEIND 0.0791* 0.0000 0.0314 0.0279 0.0354 
-0.0414 -0.0299 -0.0197 -0.0212 -0.0212 
PRIVATETARGET 0.0066 0.0021 0.0056 0.0016 0.0069 
-0.0084 -0.0082 -0.0075 -0.0082 -0.0078 
RELATIVESIZE -0.0214 -0.0403* -0.0181 -0.0475* -0.0225 
-0.0282 -0.0222 -0.0251 -0.0248 -0.0285 
DEBTEQUITYRATIO -0.0008 -0.00174* -0.0009 -0.00176* -0.0010 
-0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0009 
PTB 0.0177** 0.0107 0.0076 0.0146* 0.0117* 
-0.0078 -0.0065 -0.0063 -0.0075 -0.0067 
LOGASSETS -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0008 -0.0012 
-0.0030 -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0029 
MARKETCAP/GDP(A) -0.0120 -0.0026 -0.0008 -0.0064 -0.0026 
-0.0090 -0.0087 -0.0074 -0.0083 -0.0085 
BANKCAP/ASSET(A) 0.0021 0.0026 0.0011 0.0019 -0.0001 
-0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0024 
ATTGLOB(A) 0.0011 0.0020 0.0002 0.0014 0.0001 
-0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0039 
FISCFREEDOM(T) -0.0546 -0.0403 -0.0625* -0.0466 -0.0610 
-0.0382 -0.0348 -0.0338 -0.0358 -0.0396 
INVFREEDOM(T) 0.0250 0.0029 0.0422 0.0178 0.0248 
-0.0388 -0.0461 -0.0367 -0.0440 -0.0384 
CORRUPTINDEX(T) -0.00605** -0.00682** -0.00877*** -0.0040 -0.0031 
-0.0029 -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0040 -0.0040 
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LOGBRANCH(T) -0.0093 -0.0081 -0.0053 -0.0071 -0.0014 
-0.0131 -0.0127 -0.0112 -0.0117 -0.0126 
INFLATION(T) -0.00472** -0.00534** -0.00474* -0.00552** -0.00565** 
-0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0024 
GDPGROWTH(T) 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0001 
-0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0013 
Constant 0.0117 0.1180 0.0910 0.0468 0.0719 
-0.0883 -0.0952 -0.0903 -0.0835 -0.0872 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 
R-squared 0.326 0.334 0.402 0.342 0.372 
Adj. R-squared 0.0478 0.0588 0.1546 0.07 0.1131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 9: Summary of results 
Sr. No.  Questions   Results 
Q1  Do banking acquisitions earn abnormal returns 
for acquirers’ shareholders since the financial 
crisis? 
Yes, it had a positive and 
significant impact on the 
performance of acquisitions. 
Q2  Do cross‐border acquisitions generate higher 
returns for acquirers’ shareholders as compared 
to domestic deals since the crisis? 
No, per se, we observe no 
excess returns in cross‐border 
acquisitions since 2007‐08. 
Q3  Do cross‐border acquisitions by EE banks 
generate higher returns than DE bank 
acquisitions since the crisis? 
No, after the crisis, home 
country alone doesn’t matter 
for shareholder returns. 
Q4  Do cross‐border acquisitions generate different 
returns since the crisis depending on the 
acquirer‐target’s country of origin? 
Yes, but only EE‐DE acquisitions 
generated excess returns for 
shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
